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offered  businesses a credit based on a percentage  of 
investment  in equipment.  The stated purpose  of the 
investment  tax credit  was  to  encourage  investment  as a means 
to further modernization,  job growth, and competitiveness. 
The results of this study, however, indicate that 
investments were not significantly higher when the credit 
was  in force than during periods when it was not.  While the 
credit  may have increased  the rate of return on equipment 
investments,  additional  tests fail to find an increase in 
investment  spending due to this particular  incentive.  The 
results  also suggest that only a small fraction of 
additional  corporate  income generated by the credit was 
likely  to have been spent on investment. 
Given the need to encourage investment spending, 
especially  during recessions,  alternatives  to investment tax 
credits  should be pursued.  A logical alternative  is a 
broader  program of public  investment in education, 
infrastructure,  and research. The purpose  of the investment  tax credit  is "to 
encourage  modernization  and expansion  of the Nation's 
productive  facilities  and thereby  improve the economic 
potential  of the country, with a resultant  increase  in 
job opportunities  and betterment  of our competitive 
position  in the world  economy."  The Revenue  Act of 
1962. 
There  are  few macroeconomic  disorders  for which  a large 
injection  of investment  spending  is not considered  a 
suitable  remedy.  Keynesians  well understand  that a surge  of 
investment  spending  can bolster  aggregate  demand  and revive 
a stagnating  economy.  Supply side economists  hold the 
additional  view that inflation  is best prevented  by the 
production  of abundant  goods and services,  for which 
investment  is an obvious pre.requisite.  Investment  is also 
essential  to ensure  long-run growth and higher productivity. 
Finally,  there  is the widely  heard argument  that high levels 
of investment  are necessary  to ensure the competitiveness  of 
U.S. corporations  as they engage  foreign rivals  in the 
contest  for world market  shares.  It would be difficult  to 
exaggerate  the range of benefits  commonly  attributed  to 
investment  spending. 
Given  the goal of expanding  investment,  how does one 
ensure  that  it will be forthcoming  in sufficient  quantity? 
Only government  investment,  including education, 
infrastructure,  and research  is amenable  to direct  and 
immediate  manipulation.  Most of the remaining  investment  in 3 
the private  sector  is determined  by the disparate  actions  of 
hundreds  of large  firms and, to a lesser degree,  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  smaller  ones.  Efforts  to  promote  investment  in 
the private  sector,  have by necessity,  resorted  to indirect 
measures  such as tax incentives. 
The purpose  of this research  is to determine  the 
effectiveness  of one of these efforts,  the investment  tax 
credit.  The  implementation  of this credit  from 1962 to 1986 
constitutes  an important  experiment  in economic  policy. 
During  this period,  firms were permitted  a credit  against 
their  income  tax liability  equivalent  to a percentage  of 
their  investment  in machinery,  equipment  or furniture. 
Excluded  from the tax credit were buildings,  structural 
components,  and intangible  property. 
The most difficult  policy to assess  is one that never 
changes  over time.  Fortunately  this is not the case  for the 
investment  tax credit.  After being  introduced  in 1962, the 
credit was  suspended  from October  1966 to March  1967, 
terminated  from April  1969 to August  1971, and finally 
eliminated  in 1986.  What began as a 7 percent  credit  in 
1962 was  increased  to 10 percent  in 1975.  In addition,  the 
original  law in 1962 required  a reduction  in the depreciable 
or basis value  of the investment  equivalent  to the size of 
the credit.  This requirement  was dropped  in 1964 and 
partially  reinstated  in 1982 with  a required  reduction  in 
basis  value  equivalent  to half the credit.  Additional 
restrictions  were  applied  to certain  industries  as well  as 4 
to short-lived  assets  and investments  outside  the United 
States.  All of these changes  and qualifications  may have 
created  headaches  for tax accountants  but they enrich  the 
quality  of the experiment  by increasing  the variation  in the 
credits  over time. 
How Credits  Work 
There  are three primary ways  in which  the investment 
tax credit  is believed  to stimulate  investment.  The  first 
occurs  in response  to a change  in the cost of capital,  or 
what  is generally  referred  to as a price effect.  By 
effectively  reducing  the price of additional  capital  and 
raising  the rate of return,  the tax credit  is expected  to 
stimulate  additional  investment.  The actual response  may 
still be insignificant  if either the change  in the cost of 
capital  is small or demand  is relatively  unresponsive  to 
price  changes. 
Statistical  studies conducted  in the late 1960s were 
likely to find a strong price effect  for credits,  largely 
due to the growth of investments  following the introduction 
of the investment  tax credit  in 1962.  But this evidence  is 
at least partially  suspect  since the credit was  introduced 
in the wake  of the 1960-61recession,  a time when 
investments  were  far more likely to rise than  fall. 
A second possible  means by which  an investment  credit 
can affect  investment  is through cash flow.  By this 
mechanism,  a firm qualifying  for the tax credit reduces  its tax liability,  thus raising  its after-tax  profit.  This 
income  is then available  for capital  investment.  But  it  can 
also be used  for other purposes,  including  paying  higher 
dividends,  making  financial  investments,  buying  back 
outstanding  stock or bonds,  or financing acquisitions.  The 
question  concerning  the income effect  is: how much  of 
additional  corporate  income is spent on capital  investment? 
A third  link between  capital  expenditures  and tax 
credits  is based on the general Keynesian  multiplier  effect. 
Any expansion  in the government  deficit may create  a short- 
run stimulus  sufficient  to boost aggregate  demand  and spark 
higher  levels of investment  spending.  The effectiveness  of 
such a deficit  depends  primarily  on the state of the 
economy,  such as the level of unemployment.  It also matters 
whether  the credits  are absorbed  by the corporation, 
distributed  to stockholders  or passed through  to consumers 
in lower prices.  While  some of these issues are 
investigated  later, it is presumed  that the multiplier 
effect  of an investment  tax credit will  resemble  that of any 
other  corporate  tax cut.  The focus, therefore,  is on 
whether  the investment  tax credit provides  an additional 
incentive  to invest, above and beyond the conventional 
fiscal stimulus  induced by a corporate  tax cut. 
There  are two related measures  of equipment  investment 
spending  that could be affected by tax credits.  It is 
conceivable  that a tax  credit could increase the share of 
the nation's  output dedicated  to producer's  equipment  or it 6 
could  raise  the annual rate of growth  in investment 
spending.  Both of these variables,  equipment  shares  and 
equipment  growth,  are considered  in this study. 
There  is also a question  of whether  equipment  and GDP 
should  be adjusted  separately  for relative  prices when 
calculating  investment  shares.  This matters  only because 
equipment  prices  have diverged  from GDP prices  over the 
course  of the past  forty-five years.  In theory,  the tests 
could be conducted  using either nominal values  or real 
values  as long as relative  prices are included  in the 
model.= 
Equipment  Shares 
The historical  pattern between  equipment  investment  and 
the investment  tax credit  (ITC) is presented  in Figure  1. 
Equipment  investment  is measured  as a share of GDP and both 
are adjusted  using appropriate  price  indices.  The 
investment  tax credit  is essentially  a rate: the value  of 
credits  claimed  by corporations  divided by expenditures  on 
producer's  durable  equipment."  The pattern  for the ITC in 
' In nominal  terms,  the ratio of equipment  investment  to 
gross domestic  product  is written  as  (E/Y) and in real terms 
(El/Y').  The two ratios are related  in the following  form, 
E/Y = (E'/Y')(P,/P,)  where  P is price. 
Therefore  it shouldn't  matter which  ratio is used as long as 
the relative  price  (P,/Py) is also accounted  for.  2  After  1983,  the investment  tax credit,  reported by the 
U.S.  Internal  Revenue  Service, was combined with other 
business  credits.  This  is one of the reasons why  it doesn't 
fall to zero in 1986. 7 
the figure captures  several  important  events:  the  suspension 
from  1969 to 1971, the increase  from 7 percent  to 10 percent 
in 1975, and the final repeal  in 1986.  The  figure also 
shows  that real equipment  spending  climbed  erratically  from 
4.4 percent  in 1961 to 7.6 percent  in 1992.  While  the 
beginning  of this ascent  corresponds  with  the passage  of the 
investment  tax credit  in 1962, the trend continued  even 
after  the credit was repealed  in 1986.' 
Figure  1 
Equipment  Shares  of  GDP  and  Investment  Tax  Credits 
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Note:  Equip/GDP  is  equal  to  producer’s  durable  equipment  divided  by GDP,  both  adjusted  for 
inflation.  ITC  is equal  to total  corporate  investment  tax  credits  divided  by equipment  investment. 
Sources:  National  Income  Product  Accounts  (NIPA)  and  Corporation  Income  Tax  Returns,  IRS. 
3 The correlation  coefficient  between  the two variables  is 
(.51). 8 
In  order  to  properly  assess  the  impact  of  the  ITC  on 
equipment  spending,  other  factors  must  be  accounted  for.  A 
particularly  important  one  is  equipment  prices.'  As  can  be 
seen  in  Figure  2,  the  upward  trend  in  real  equipment 
investment  from  1962  to  1992  coincides  with  a downward  trend 
in  equipment  prices.  This  is  one  of  the  competing  variables 
to  explain  equipment  investments. 
Figure  2 
Equipment  Shares  of  GDP  and  Prices 
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Note:  Equip/GDP  defined  in  Figure  1.  Equip  price  is  equal  to  the  price  deflator  for  producer’s 
durable  equipment  divided  by  the  price  deflator  for  GDP. 
Source:  NIPA. 
' This  is equal  to the ratio of the price deflator  for 
producer's  durable  equipment  divided by the GDP deflator. 9 
Equipment  prices  and the investment  tax credit  fall 
into the category  of cost of capital  variables  along with 
real  interest  rates and marginal  tax rates.  Capital  is 
relatively  cheaper when  tax rates,  interest  rates,  and 
equipment  prices  are lower.  Other variables  that could 
influence  equipment  investment  are corporate  cash  flow, 
which  captures  the income effect,  and capacity  utilization. 
It is anticipated  that firms will be more  likely to invest 
after  excess  capacity  has been exhausted. 
For the most part, these variables  and analysis, 
described  in Appendix  A, follow conventional  lines.  There 
is, however,  one innovation  that warrants  an explanation. 
Most  studies  of investment  behavior  rely on a single measure 
of capital  costs.  This has the unfortunate  characteristic 
of combining  current  variables  which  should have a direct 
effect  on investment--like  equipment  prices--with  current 
variables  that serve as proxies  for future variables--like 
marginal  tax rates and real interest rates.  Instead,  I 
chose  to measure  the effects of several of the most 
prominent  components  of the cost of capital  as separate 
entities.  This approach  places  the least restrictions  on 
how  firms actually  process  current  information  in developing 
future expectations. 
The results  of this statistical  analysis  demonstrate 
that investment  levels are significantly  higher when 
capacity  utilization  is high or equipment  prices  are low. 
Tax credits,  whether  included  separately  or in the full 10 
model,  do not appear  to have a significant  effect  on levels 
of equipment  investment.  The coefficient  on investment  tax 
credits  was  not significantly  different  from zero in either 
case.  The  coefficients  on cash flow, real interest  rates, 
and marginal  tax rates were  neither  significant  nor always 
the expected  sign.  There  is no compelling  evidence  here of 
a strong  impact of investment  tax credits  on levels of 
investment  spending.  Other  results are discussed  in more 
detail  in Appendix  A. 
The absence  of a strong positive  effect of tax credits 
on equipment  investment  is an important  result.  However,  it 
is equally  important  to consider  the specific  channels  in 
which  the credit  is expected  to work.  To this end, we must 
investigate  the price  and income effects. 
The Price  Effect 
In an early  article  investigating  price effects  and 
investment  behavior,  Hall and Jorgenson  (1967) concluded 
that,  "the investment  tax credit  has been a potent  stimulus 
to the level of investment;  it also shifted  the composition 
of investment  toward  equipment."  This highlights  an 
important  point:  if the tax credit has a distinct  price 
effect,  the composition  of investment  should shift  in favor 
of equipment.  Figure  3 shows producer's  durable  equipment 
as a share of nonresidential  investment,  both corrected 
separately  for inflation.  The ratio rose from 49 percent  in 
1961 to 73 percent  in 1992.  The investment  tax credit  from 11 
Figure  1 is  also  reproduced  here.  It  should  be  evident  from 
the  figure  that  the  composition  of  investment  shifted 
towards  equipment  when  the  investment  tax  credit  was  in 
effect.  But  investment  became  even  more  equipment  intensive 
after  the  credit  was  repealed  in  1986. 
Figure  3 
Equipment  Share  of  Nonresidential  invest1 1 
Relative  Prices  and  the  ITC  - 
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Note:  ITC  defined  in  Figure  1.  Equip/Invest  is  equal  to  producer’s  durable  equipment  divided  by 
nonresidential  fixed  investment.  Equip  price  is  equal  to the  ratio  of price  deflators  for  equipment 
and  nonresidential  fixed  investment.  Source:  NIPA  and  Corporate  Income  Tax  Returns,  IRS. 12 
A second  possible  explanation  for the changing 
composition  of investment  is also included  in the Figure  3. 
Equipment  prices  relative  to nonresidential  investment  fell 
gradually  from the early  1960s to the present.  Separate 
statistical  analysis  shows that relative  prices  are 
statistically  significant  in a model  that explains  93 
percent  of the variation  in equipment  composition.  The 
investment  tax credit,  however,  had the wrong  sign and was 
insignificant.'  It doesn't  appear  that the presence  of the 
investment  tax credit steers  firms towards  equipment 
investment  as one would  expect under the price effect. 
What  is the possibility  that equipment  and structures 
are complements  rather that substitutes,  allowing  tax 
credits  to actually  stimulate  both  forms of investment? 
This  seems unlikely  because  equipment  investment  succeeded 
in rising  relative  to structures  in the late 198Os, without 
the benefit  of the investment  tax credit.  It is also worth 
remembering  that even if a fixed proportion  between 
structures  and equipment  characterized  every single business 
in the United  States,  it would not necessarily  apply to the 
country  as a whole.  The reason is that some businesses  are 
relatively  more equipment  intensive while  others  are 
3.  The ratio of real equipment  spending  (El) to real 
nonresidential  investment  (N') is regressed  on the 
investment  tax credit and the ratio of price  indices  for E 
and N.  An adjustment  was made for autocorrelation.  The 
result,  with  standard  errors  in parentheses  was, 
E'/N' = 1.16  - .20 ITC - .52 P,/P,  RZ =  .93  DW = 1.67 
(.122)  (.25)  (all) 13 
structure  intensive.  If  the  tax  credit  shifted  investment 
towards  equipment  intensive  businesses,  the relative  share 
of equipment  investment  for the United  States would  rise. 
While  the absence  of a verifiable  price  effect  is 
insufficient  to discredit  the investment  tax credit,  it 
certainly  limits  its potential  effectiveness.  Only a strong 
price  effect  permits  a small tax credit to produce  a large 
increase  in investment.  We now turn to the other possible 
mechanism,  the income effect. 
Income Effect 
According  to the income effect,  if a firm is given a 
tax refund,  it is likely to spend some part of it on 
additional  investment.  The  fact that it is given to firms 
that make  relatively  high investments  should  further 
increase  this likelihood.  But even in the best of 
circumstances,  some portion  of the credit  is likely to be 
diverted  to other purposes.  The goal of the tax credit 
could be entirely  frustrated  if the additional  cash  flow is 
simply used  to pay higher dividends,  buy back outstanding 
stock or debt,  or replace more conventional  sources  of 
investment  funds.  Each of these possibilities  are 
considered  in turn. 
Tax  Incidence 
At the very  first stage, tax credits  could be 
distributed  to either consumers  or employees  in the form of 14 
lower  prices  or higher  salaries.  It  is  curious  that  some 
analysts  would  dismiss  this response  as  unrealistic,  but 
readily  accept  the companion  view, that tax increases  are 
passed  on to consumers  or employees  in the form of higher 
prices  or lower salaries.  If the burden of the corporate 
profit  tax is shifted  to consumers  or employees  then  it is 
at least conceivable  that tax credits provide  relief  to the 
same parties.  The point  is that whatever  portion  of a tax 
credit  is shifted  in this manner will not be available  for 
additional  investment;  a dollar  of tax credit will  raise 
corporate  profits  after-taxes  by something  less than a 
dollar. 
There  are many reasons  to suspect that corporations  pay 
for most  of the corporate  income tax, not the least of which 
is their  staunch  opposition  to it.  In my own work,  I've 
observed  that the size of the price  increase necessary  to 
pass on,  the corporate  profit  tax varies widely  among 
different  companies  in the same industry and for the same 
company  over time."  This  fact alone makes  it very difficult 
to pass on the corporate  income tax without 
disproportionately  benefiting  some firms. 
No amount  of hypothesizing,  of course, will  settle  this 
issue.  The test is whether  a reduction  in average  tax rates 
is associated  with  constant  profits before-taxes  (no 
shifting)  or falling profits  (shifting).  The relationship 
2 See Karier  (1990) 15 
between  corporate  profit  shares  before  taxes  and  average  tax 
rates  is  presented  in  Figure  4:' 
Figure  4 
Average  Tax  Rates  and  Corporate  Profit  Shares  (Before-Taxes) 
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Note:  Profit is defined  as corporate  profits, including  inventory  valuation  adjustments,  capital 
consumption  adjustment,  and corporate  net interest.  Average  tax  rate is equal  to corporate  profit 
tax  liability  divided  by  profit.  Source:  NIPA. 
3 Profits,  equal  to total corporate  profits with  inventory 
and capital  consumption  adjustments  plus net interest  paid 
by the corporate  sector,  are divided by gross domestic 
product  to obtain  a share.  Average  corporate  tax rates  are 
equal to total corporate  tax liabilities  divided  by the same 
profit  measure.  Data  is from the national  income product 
accounts. 16 
As illustrated  by the figure, profit  shares mirror  the 
business  cycle and experienced  a one-time  drop around  1970. 
After  averaging  approximately  11 percent  from 1946 to 1970, 
the profit  share slid to about 9 percent  from 1970 to 1992. 
Average  tax rates also declined  during  the period.  They 
fell from over 50 percent  in 1951 to less than 30 percent  in 
1992.  The question  is: did corporations  distribute  the tax 
savings  to consumers  and employees,  thus reducing  their 
profits  before-taxes? 
There  are two reasons  to believe  this was not the case. 
First,  the pattern  of decline  in profit  shares does not* 
match  the pattern  of decline  in tax rates.  Whereas  profit 
shares  appear  to shift to a new, lower average  around  1970, 
the decline  in tax rates is concentrated  in three distinct 
periods:  1951 to 1954, 1960 to 1965, and 1980 to 1983. 
A second objection  is that most of the variation  in 
profit  shares can easily be accounted  for by other  factors. 
Changes  in capacity  utilization  directly  affects profit 
shares  and explains much of its movement  over the business 
cycle.  Profit  shares are also affected by the level of 
price  competition  in the United  States, which  can be 
stimulated  by the growth of imports. 
A statistical  test shows that these two variables, 
capacity  utilization  and import shares of gross domestic 
product,  can account  for approximately  81 percent  of the 
variation  in profit  shares over this period.  The predicted 17 
values  of  this  simple  model  are  compared  to  the  actual 
values  in  Figure  5. 
Figure  5 
Corporate  Profit  Shares  (Before-Taxes) 
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Note:  Actual  profit  shares  are  defined  in  Figure  4.  Predicted  values  are  based  on  the  regression  in 
Appendix  B,  Table  3.  column  2. 
Source:  NIPA  and  author’s  calculations. 
This  illustrates  that there is very  little variation 
for tax rates to explain  once these other variables  are 
accounted  for.  The details  of this statistical  test are 
presented  in Appendix  B, but it should be noted that once 18 
capacity  utilization  and imports are  included  in  the  model, 
the  effect  of tax rates on profits  is  not  in  the  direction 
one  would  expect  for shifting  nor is  it  statistically 
significant. 
All of this evidence  points to the conclusion  that 
reductions  in the corporate  tax rate, including  investment 
tax credits,  are not, for the most part, passed  on to 
consumers  and employees.  Instead,  firms are left with 
relatively  higher  after-tax  income which  is, at the very 
least,  available  to finance additional  investment.  This 
brings  us to the next potential  leakage, dividends. 
The  fraction  of profits  after-taxes  actually 
distributed  as dividends  from 1946 to 1992 is reported  in 
Figure  6.  In the  1980s and 199Os, approximately  60 percent 
of after-tax  income was paid out in dividends  compared  to 
approximately  45 percent  during  the 195Os, 196Os, and  1970s. 
In addition  to this general  increase, dividend  shares  tend 
to move  counter-cyclically,  rising  in recessions  and falling 
in expansions.  A simple statistical  analysis  covering  1946 
to 1992 shows that  for every dollar  increase  in after-tax 
profits,  dividends  increased by 56 cents.' 
1  In this case, dividends  (D) paid by U.S. corporations 
from 1946 to 1992 were regressed  on corporate  after-tax 
income  (I).  Estimates  were adjusted  for autocorrelation. 
The results were, 
D = -2.53 +  .564 I  Adj.R" =  .97  DW  =  1.7 
(2.87)  (.025) 19 
Figure  6 
Dividends  as  a  Share  of  After-Tax  PmCik 
---...- 
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Source:  NIPA. 
This doesn't  necessarily  mean that 56 percent  of the 
savings  from an investment  tax credit will be distributed  as 
dividends.  The actual amount could be more or less but this 
provides  a useful  benchmark.  There  is also no assurance 
that the remainder,  retained  earnings, will be devoted 
exclusively  to additional  real investment.  The  funds made 20 
available  from  tax  credits  could  be  used  by  a  company  to  buy 
stocks  and bonds of other companies,  to purchase  its own 
stocks  or bonds,  or to finance a merger  or take-over.  It is 
equally  possible  that these  funds would  simply  supplant 
other  sources  of investment  funds such as the sale of debt 
or equity.  Each of these diversions  tends to dilute  the 
amount  of the tax credit ultimately  spent on new investment. 
How much of after-tax  profits  are diverted  and how much 
spent on real property,  plant, and equipment.  Another  way 
to investigate  this question  is to look at the behavior  of a 
large number  of f<rms.  For this purpose,  a sample was drawn 
of 1,837 companies  from Compustat  Database  for the most 
recent year,  1991.'  Income was measured  after  taxes but 
before  extraordinary  items and investment was equal to 
capital  expenditure  on property,  plant and equipment. 
Appendix  C describes  this model and the test which  includes 
several  additional  variables  representing  sources  of 
investment  funds.  The results  show that a firm with  a 
dollar  more of income after-taxes  spends only twelve  cents 
more on property,  plant, and equipment.  The same  firm, 
however,  spends approximately  40.cents more on dividends, 
and reduces  its sale of stock  (less repurchases)  by as much 
as 21 cents and its sale of debt by 17 cents.  The 
conclusion  is that firms with relatively  higher after-tax 
1  Companies  with  sales of less than ten million  dollars  or 
income  losses greater  than a billion dollars were  excluded. 
Companies  were  also excluded  if these or other cash flow 
variables  were missing  in either  1990 or 1991. 21 
income distribute  more dividends  and sell relatively  less 
value  of stocks  and bonds.  The amount that trickles  down 
into additional  investment  is not large. 
Investment  and Economic  Growth 
The popular  image of equipment  investment  was 
reinforced  in a recent  article by Lawrence  Summers  and J. De 
Long  (1991).  The authors  claimed  that countries  with  a 
relatively  high  level of equipment  investment  also 
experienced  relatively  high growth rates.  The surprising 
result w&z  that this relationship  held only  for equipment 
investment  and not for related  investments  in structures. 
The beneficial  effect of high levels of equipment 
investment  spending  is unfortunately  not as readily  apparent 
for the United  States  from 1950 to 1992.  Figure  7 shows  the 
ratio of spending  for durable  equipment  to GDP and the 
growth  rates of real GDP, calculated  as five year moving 
averages.  There  is little evidence  in this figure that high 
levels of private  investment  in equipment  are associated 
with  strong  economic  growth. 
One possible  explanation  for this result  is related  to 
energy  efficiency.  Rising energy prices  in the 1970s 
created  a strong demand  for more energy efficient  equipment 
and structures.  It is conceivable  that in the process  of 
becoming  more  energy efficient,  U.S. capital  investments 
contributed  less to real advances  in output.  An indication 
of how profound  the change  in energy efficiency  actually  was 22 
Figure  7 
Real  GDP  Growth  and  Equipment  Shares  of  GDP 
Percentage  Change  and  Share  of  GDP 
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Source:  NIPA. 
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five  year  moving  average. 
is  illustrated  in Figure  8.  This shows the relative  output 
of the industrial  sector per unit of energy.'  By this 
measure,  energy efficiency  climbed  56  percent  between  1972 
and  1991.  There  is one problem with this explanation, 
1  The measure  is equal to the industrial production  index 
reported  in the Economic  Report  of the President,  1993, 
divided  by industrial  energy consumed  in British  thermal 
units,  reported  in the Annual  Energy Review,  U.S. Department 
of Energy. 23 
however.  Energy  prices  leveled off in the 198Os, energy 
efficiency  stabilized  and yet high levels of equipment 
investment  still  failed to boost economic  growth. 
Figure  8 
Industrial  Energy  Efficiency 
46  51  56  61  66  71  76  81  86  91 
Year 
Note:  Index  is  equal  to  industrial  production  index  divided  by  total  energy  consumed  by  industry 
measured  in  Btu. 
Source:  Economic  Report  to  the  President,  1993  and  Annual  Energy  Review,  Dept.  of  Energy. 
Most  likely other  factors are at the root of the 
slowdown  in economic  growth,  but Figure  7 serves  as a useful 
reminder  that boosting  the share of national  output 
dedicated  to equipment  investment  does  not guarantee 
economic  growth. 24 
This  fact  should  not  be  construed  to  mean  that 
investment  spending  is  not  important.  There  is  still  the 
very  familiar  fact,  presented  in  Figure  9,  that  annual 
changes  in  real  investment  spending  are  closely  related  to 
annual  changes  in  real  GDP.  It may  be  difficult  to  sort  out 
the  causality  in  this  relationship  but  at  least  some  part  of 
it  can  be  attributed  to  the  fact  that  rapid  changes  in 
investment  spending  can  alter  the  trajectory  of  economic 
growth.  In  this  lies  a paramount  need  for  public  policy:  to 
ameliorate  or  compensate  for  the  volatility  of  private 
sector  investment. 
Figure  9 
GDP  and  Equipment  investment 
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Note:  GDP  and  producer’s  durable  equipment  investment  are  both  corrected  for  inflation  and  then 
calculated  as  annual  growth  rates. 
Source:  NIPA. 25 
Does the historical  record have anything  to say about 
the effectiveness  of an investment  tax credit  as a counter- 
cyclical  tool?  In its first few years of existence,  the 
investment  tax credit was actually  used to counter  the 
business  cycle.  It was  initially  deployed  when  investment 
was  relatively  low and then revoked  twice:  in 1966 and  1969, 
when  investment  showed  signs of recovering.'  But between 
reinstatement  in 1971 and repeal  in 1986, the credit was 
offered  in good times and bad.  The end of the credit  as a 
counter-cyclical  policy  after  1971 marked  a victory  for the 
business  sector which 
permanent  tax cut. 
The relationship 
had-  from the start insisted  on a 
between  the investment  tax credit  and 
real growth  in equipment  investment was analyzed  in more 
detail  and described  in Appendix  A.  In general,  there was 
no evidence  that the existence  of the tax credit  had any 
significant  effect  on this growth rate.  Only conventional 
business  cycle variables,  capacity  utilization  and real GDP 
growth,  had a positive  and significant  impact on the growth 
of equipment  investment.'  There  is reason  to suspect  from 
this evidence,  that the investment  tax credit would  not have 
made  an effective  counter-cyclical  tool. 
I  Another  reason offered  to repeal the investment  tax 
credit  in 1966 by Senator Al Gore, was because  of its 
quality  as a special  subsidy to capital.  See King  (1993) 
page  287. 
2 At least part of this significance  can be attributed  to 
the reverse  causality,  that higher  investment  contributes  to 
higher  GDP growth and capacity  utilization. 26 
Marginal  Tax Credits 
A revised  form of the investment  tax credit was 
recently  proposed  by President  Clinton's  advisor's  and 
tested  in an economic  model by Meyer,  Prakken  and Varvares 
(1993).  The basic Clinton  plan included  some aspects  of the 
investment  tax credit  as it existed  in 1985 except  that  it 
limited  credits  to investments  exceeding  some fraction  (70 
to 80 percent)  of historic  levels.  The purpose  of the 
threshold  was to preserve  the strong  incentive  for 
additional  investment  without  rewarding  all investments, 
thus saving  the government  some tax revenue. 
It is less widely  appreciated  that the original 
proposal  for the investment  tax credit  in the Kennedy 
administration  included a similar marginal  criteria.  The 
Treasury's  initial proposal  in 1961 offered  a credit  of "15 
percent  of expenditures  for new and tangible  plants  and 
equipment  in excess of 100 percent  depreciation"  and "a 
credit  equal to 6 percent  of capital outlays  greater  than 50 
percent  of depreciation  and an automatic  lo-percent  credit 
on the  first $5,000 of new investment.  .  .‘I3 
It was this graduated  aspect of the investment  credit 
which  incited much of the business  opposition  to the 
original  proposal.  Businesses  where much  less interested  in 
the incentive  aspect of the credit than they were  in the 
income-enhancing  aspects which were sharply curtailed  by a 
graduated  tax.  Lobbyists  for businesses  thought  they could 
3  King  (19931, page  175. 27 
do better  and they did  by  pressuring  the  Kennedy 
administration  to adopt a flat 7 percent  rate  which  became 
law in 1962. 
Only  if the investment  tax credit works  through  the 
price  effect  does  a marginal  or graduated  rate make  any 
sense.  This  is because  it preserves  the price  incentives 
while  reducing  the income effect.  The problem  with  this 
logic  is not theoretical  but empirical.  As we have seen,  7 
percent  and  10 percent  tax credits  in the past were  not 
sufficient  incentives  to spark a discernible  growth  in 
equipment  investment  relative  to structures.  A marginal  tax 
credit  has the advantage  of a smaller  impact on the 
government  budget  but its reliance  on price effects,  does 
not promise  any significant  growth  in investment. 
Conclusion 
For more  than twenty years,  the federal government 
provided  corporations  with billions  of dollars  worth  of tax 
credits  in the hope of raising  the level of investment  in 
equipment.  According  to the evidence  presented  here,  these 
credits  did not have a perceptible  impact on either  the 
growth  in real equipment  expenditures  or the proportion  of 
national  output dedicated  to equipment  investment. 
These  observations  were  reinforced  by more detailed 
investigations  into how tax credits are supposed  to work. 
Although  the tax credit was supposed  to increase  the 
importance  of equipment  in total nonresidential  investment, 28 
the evidence  is  lacking.  The  tax  credit  did  not  appear  to 
have any perceptible  impact on the composition  of 
investment.  Furthermore,  while  some of the credit may be 
spent directly  on additional  investment,  that amount may be 
miniscule.  The estimate  in this study  found that  12 cents 
of every every additional  dollar of after-tax  income was 
spent on property  plant and equipment.  The remainder  is 
typically  used to pay higher dividends,  buy stocks or bonds, 
or release  firms from the need to sell as much debt or 
equity. 
Much  of the evidence  presented  here in regard to the 
investment  tax credit has a direct relevance  to the 
effectiveness  of other corporate  tax breaks.  Marginal  tax 
rates on corporate  income have declined  steadily  over the 
past  forty years  and yet the evidence  in this research  does 
not show any perceptible  response  in higher equipment 
investment.  Generous  depreciation  rates have increased 
corporate  cash flow, but only a small fraction of this is 
likely to see its way  into new investment. 
While  investment  tax credits may not contribute  much  to 
economic  growth,  there is no reason to abandon  the effort  to 
stimulate  investment,  both  for its value  in countering  the 
business  cycle and for creating  new job opportunities.  The 
failure of tax incentives  to stimulate private  sector 
investment  only means  that future efforts may be more 
successful  if they concentrate  on raising public  sector 
investment.  It is important,  if not obvious,  that a dollar 29 
spent  on  public  investment  will  produce  a dollar  of  public 
investment.  There  are  more  than  a  few  promising 
opportunities  for  public  investment  in  education, 
infrastructure,  and  research  and  development. 30 
Appendix  A 
Investment  and the Tax Credit 
This  section  describes  the statistical  tests used to 
investigate  the relationship  between  investment  tax credits 
and equipment  investment.  These  tests utilized  aggregate 
annual  data  for the United  States  from 1946 to 1992.  The 
hypothesis  is that equipment  investment  should be a function 
of three sets of variables:  cost of capital,  cash  flow, and 
capacity  utilization. 
Conventional  estimates  of capital  costs typically 
combine  several  parameters,  such as capital  prices,  tax 
rates,  real  interest  rates, and tax credits  into a single 
annual  value.  In fact, this method  produces  a single  value 
that  is equivalent  to an annual rent payment whose  present 
value  over the lifetime  of the equipment--properly 
discounted  for time, depreciation,  and future taxes--is 
equal  to the current  price  (Hall and Jorgenson,  1967).  It 
is easy to forget that at any moment  in time, a firm only 
knows  the purchase  price and tax credit  for certain,  all 
other variables,  such as real interest and tax rates apply 
to the future and are unknown.  Consequently,  my approach  is 
to include  each variable  separately,  under  the presumption 
that unknown  variables  may have less influence  on investment 
decisions. 
One of the cost of capital variables  is the real 
interest  rate which  is represented  by the prime  rate of 
interest  less the rate of inflation  (GDP deflator).  Another 
cost of capital  variable  is the corporate  tax rate which  is 
equal  to the statutory  tax rate on corporate  income. 
Equipment  prices  are represented  by the ratio of the price 
deflator  for producer's  durable  equipment  to the deflator 
for GDP.  In addition,  the investment  tax credit  is included 
as the ratio of total corporate  investment  tax credits 
divided  by producer's  durable  equipment. 
Other variables  include capacity  utilization  for 
manufacturing  and cash flow, equivalent  to the sum of 
,consumption of fixed capital  for corporations  and 
undistributed  corporate  profits.  The dependent  variable, 
equipment  investment,  was adjusted  for inflation  and then 
divided  by GDP, similarly  adjusted.  All of the variables 
were  obtained  from the national  income product  accounts 
except  for the prime  interest rate and capacity  utilization 
which were  obtained  from the Economic Report to the 
President, 1993. 
Not surprisingly,  the model using ordinary  least 
squares  demonstrated  a high degree of first order serial 
correlation.  Therefore,  the results presented  in Table  1 
are based  on a correction  for autocorrelation. 
In the first column, the cash flow variable  alone  is 
tested  and found to have an insignificant  effect on 
equipment  investment.  This conclusion  is not changed  in the 31 
Table  1 
Dependent  Variable:  Real Equipment  Investment/Real  GDP 
Single:  Annual  Observations,  1950-1992 
1  2  3 
Cash  Flow/GDP  .02S  -.019 
(.103)  (.082) 
Real Interest 
4% 
Tax Rate  -.013 
1.015) 
Equipment  Prices  - .osd** 
l.016) 
Investment  Tax  .Oll  .032 
Credit  t.062)  (.049) 
Capacity  .049** 
Utilization  a  .009 
Constant  .061"  .063++ 
f.012)  1.009)  (:Zt, 
Adjusted  R'  .a9  .89  .95 
Distribution  1.55  1.54  1.55 
Note:  Standard  errors  in  parentheses 
l * Significantly  differant  fram  zerc  at the  1%  level.  (2.70) 
l  Significantly  different  from  zom  at the  5% level.  (2.03) 
l  Coefficient  and standard  error  multiplied  by 100. 
full model  in column  3.  The effect of the investment  tax 
credit  alone  is tested  in column 2 and for the full model  in 
column  3.  In neither  case is the investment  tax credit 
found to have a significant  impact on equipment  investment. 
Equipment  investments  do respond  significantly  to two 
variables,  equipment  prices  and capacity  utilization.  Low 
equipment  prices  or high capacity  utilization  appears  to 
stimulate  equipment  investment. 
It should  be emphasized  that according  to these 
results,  equipment  prices  have a negative  effect  on real 
equipment  investment.  Because  the elasticity  implied by the 
coefficient  on equipment  prices  is very nearly  one, changes 
in equipment  prices will  have almost no effect  on the 
nominal  amount  of equipment  investment.'  This may  simply be 
a characteristic  of the demand  for equipment  goods, but 
there  is another  possibility.  If firms make decisions  about 
how much  to spend on investment,  independent  of prices  for 
investment  goods,  the regression  results would  not be any 
different.  In this case,  firms simply allocate  a certain 
amount  for investment  based on their current  level of 
capacity  utilization.  If equipment  prices are unusually 
low, firms would  spend the same nominal amount but get more 
for their money.  It is beyond  the capacity  of this model  to 
confirm  or deny this possibility. 
I  The actual  elasticity,  calculated  at the means,  is  .91. 32 
An  additional  set of tests were conducted  using  the 
annual  growth  of  real  equipment  investment  as the dependent 
variable.  The results  are reported  in Table  2.  The 
investment  tax  credit  continues  to  have  an  insignificant 
effect  when  tested  alone  or  in  the  full  model.  Cash  flow 
has  a  significant  positive  effect  on  equipment  growth  when 
estimated  alone  but  not  in  the  full  model.  Only  capacity 
utilization  and  the  growth  of  real  GDP have a significant 
effect  on equipment  growth, which  in both cases,  is 
positive.  The coefficients  on these two variables  are 
likely to overstate  the actual effects  since the variables 
themselves  are likely to be influenced  by equipment  growth. 
Table  2 
Dependent  Variable:  Growth  in Real  Equipment  Expenditures 
Sample:  Annual  Observations,  1951-1992 
1  2  3 
Cash Flow  3.80.  1.91 
(1.67)  (1.30 
Real  Interest  .380 
l.299 
Tax Rate  .284 
(.239) 
Equipment  Prices 





Constant  -.276 
t.1391 
Adjusted  R'  .09 
-.317 
t.160) 
.543  .200 





.022  -.682** 
f.017)  t.243) 
.Ol  .78 
Durbin  Watson  2.01  1.98  1.95 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses 
l * Significantly different from zero at the 1% level.  (2.70) 
l  Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. (2.03) 
'  Coefficient and standard error multiplied by 100. 
In this study, cash flow is not found to make a 
significant  contribution  to equipment  investment.  Although 
a small percentage  of additional  income is likely to be 
spent on new investment,  the result  is not  large  enough  to 
show  up  in  this  analysis.  There  are,  however,  many 
opportunities  to  overstate  this  relationship. 33 
It should  be remembered  that cash  flow is comprised  of 
two distinct  components,  undistributed  profits  and capital 
consumption  allowances.  Capital  consumption  allowances  are 
likely  to be correlated  with current  investment  levels  for 
the simple  fact that both are correlated  with  past 
investment.  I found this relationship  to hold  for both 
annual  aggregate  data described  in this Appendix  as well  as 
for company  observations  described  in Appendix  C.  Because 
of this  fact, there  is a tendency  to overstate  the effect  of 
cash  flow on investment.  The problem  is largely  eliminated 
in this model  by correcting  for autocorrelation.  Once the 
correlation  between  current  investment  levels and past 
investment  levels  is reduced,  the correspondence  between 
cash  flow  (depreciation)  and current  investment  also 
diminishes." 
The other component  of cash  flow is undistributed 
profits.  This  term is less likely to be related  to past 
levels of investment  spending but is more  likely  to be 
correlated  with  other business  cycle variables,  including 
growth of real investment  spending.  To some extent  this  is 
due to the  fact that an increase  in undistributed  profits 
will  increase  investments  but there is also the fact that 
both profits  and investments  are independently  related  to 
the business  cycle.  This may be the reason why cash  flow is 
no longer  significant  when business  cycle variables  are 
included  in the statistical  tests  (column 3,  Table  2). 
2  This  is apparent  because  cash flow is statistically 
significant  when  ordinary  least squares  is used but not when 
the estimates  are adjusted  for first order serial 
correlation. 34 
Appendix  B 
Tax  Incidence 
This  section  explains  the statistical  model  and test of 
the relationship  between  profits  before-taxes  and tax rates. 
To the extent  that corporate  taxes  (and tax reductions)  are 
passed  through  to consumers  and employees,  average  tax rates 
should  be positively  related  to profits  before-taxes.  This 
is tested using  a profit model based on my previous  work 
(Karier  1993). 
The model  uses the following variables:  profits  before 
taxes  (IT),  output  (q), price  (p), revenue  (R), marginal  cost 
(mc), and average  cost  (ac).  By definition, 
1)  m =  pq-(Wq  = q(p-mc+mc-ac)  = q(p-mc)+  q(mc-ac) 
Dividing  both sides by revenue produces  the result, 
2)  K/R = (p-mc)/p + q(mc-ac)/R 
The  first term on the right-hand-side  of equation  2 is 
defined  as the markup  over marginal  costs.  When  firms 
maximize  profits,  this term is equal to the inverse  of the 
elasticity  of demand,  defined  as monopoly  power.  The second 
term,  including  the difference  between marginal  and average 
cost,  is related  to capacity  utilization.  Presuming 
conventional  short-run  cost curves, marginal  cost is likely 
to exceed  average  cost when capacity  is tight, a 
relationship  which  is reversed when capacity  is under- 
utilized. 
To the extent that higher taxes are passed  through  to 
consumers,  firms must  increase their markups  resulting  in 
higher  profits  before-taxes.  Or, if higher taxes are passed 
back to employees,  who are forced to accept  lower wages, 
then marginal  costs decrease  and markups  still rise.  Tax 
rates  should  therefore  be positively  related to profits 
before-taxes  if taxes are passed through to either  consumers 
or employees. 
Another  factor that is likely to affect monopoly  power 
is the level of foreign competition  represented  by imports. 
The greater  the competition  from imports, the lower the 
level of monopoly  power and markups. 
This model was estimated  using annual data  from 1948 to 
1992.  Profit  shares were equal to corporate  profits  with 
inventory  and capital  consumption  adjustments  plus net 
interest  paid by the corporate  sector, divided by gross 
domestic  product.  The tax rate was equal to corporate 
profit  tax liability  divided  by the same profit measure. 
Imports were  simply divided  by gross domestic  product,  and 
like each of the preceding  variables, were  obtained  from the 
national  income product  accounts.  Finally,  capacity 
utilization  was obtained  for manufacturing  from the  1993 
Economic  Report  to the President. 35 
Estimation  of this model  is presented  in Table  3, with 
corrections  for first order serial correlation. 
Table  3 
Dependent  Variable:  Corporate  Profits  (Before-Taxes)/GDP 
Sample:  Annual  Observations,  1948-1992. 
1  2  3  4 
Tax  Rate  ,063  -.021  -.029 
t.028)  1.028)  c.024) 





Utilization'  (:022) 
Imports/GDP  -.247++ 
l.065) 
Constant  .076*'  .015  005 
(.Oll)  t.0171  (:  017)  (% 
- .290” 
C.075) 
Adjusted R'  .63  .64  .83  .81 
Durbin Watson  1.70  1.61  1.64  1.59 
Note  :  Standard errors in parentheses 
l * Significantly different from zero at the 1% level.  (2.70) 
l * Significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  (2.03) 
'  Coefficient and standard error multiplied by 100. 
The  first column  shows the results of regressing  only tax 
rates on profit  shares.  The coefficient  on tax rates  is 
positive  and nearly  significant  at the 5 percent  level. 
This result  captures  the fact that both series have been 
declining  over the past 45 years  as illustrated  in Figure  4. 
This  correlation  is suspect,  however,  since the timing  for 
the declines  in profit  shares and tax rates are visibly 
different. 
As the third column  in Table  3 illustrates,  the 
coefficient  on tax rates changes  signs and is far from 
significant  once capacity  utilization  is added to the model. 
This result  is also evident  in column  3 which  includes  the 
import variable.  Profits  are significantly  higher when 
capacity  utilization  is higher and imports are lower.  This 
simple model  captures  81 percent  of the variance  in profit 
shares.  The lack of significance  for the tax rate 
coefficient,  or even the correct  sign, provides  little 
evidence  that the cash generated  from tax reductions  are 
passed  through  to consumers  or employees.  The conclusion  is 
that tax reductions  during  this period contributed  to 
relatively  higher  profits  after-taxes. 36 
Appendix  C 
Company  Data 
A second  series of tests were conducted  to investigate 
the relationship  between  after-tax  income and investment. 
The tests were  applied  to a sample of 1,837 firms drawn  from 
Compustat  database  for the most recent year of available 
data,  1991.  Since  it is a cross-section,  the cost of 
capital  variables  were dropped  but additional  cash  flow 
variables  were  added.  The dependent  variable  is based  on 
net capital  expenditures  for property,  plant,  and equipment. 
Cash  flow is separated  into depreciation  and amortization, 
income before  extraordinary  income  (ordinary income),  and 
extraordinary  income.  Other variables were  included  to 
control  for other sources  (and when negative,  uses) of 
funds.  These  included the cash obtained  from: the net sales 
of financial  investments,  the net sales of the company's  own 
stock,  and the net sales of the company's  debt.  All of 
these variables  are divided  by company  net sales to obtain  a 
share. 
The results  of estimating  this model using ordinary 
least squares  are presented  in the first two columns  of 
Table  4.  It should be noted that the coefficients  on three 
of the additional  variables--net  investment,  net debt,  and 
net stock--  are all positive  as expected  and significant  at 
the one percent  level.  Also significant  is the cash  flow 
term and its components,  depreciation  and ordinary  income. 
Only extraordinary  income appears  to be unrelated  to the 
level of investment  spending.  The coefficient  on ordinary 
income  in column  2 indicates  that firms with an additional 
dollar  of income,  spend  12 cents more on investment. 
A second  test looked at the change  in investment 
spending  from 1990 to 1991 for the same firms.  The 
numerator  for each variable was recalculated  to equal the 
difference  from 1990 to 1991 and divided by net sales in 
1991.  The results  of this regression  are reported  in column 
3 of the same table.  The results  for depreciation,  net 
investment,  net debt, and net stock remain positive  and 
highly  significant.  The coefficient  on ordinary  income, 
however,  reverses  signs and continues  to be significant.  At 
least  for this one year,  firms that experienced  an increase 
in income were more  likely to reduce their  level of 
investment  spending.  Increases  in all other sources  of 
funds had the expected  effect of raising  investment. 
If only a small fraction of higher income is spent on 
real investment,  what happens to the rest?  Other tests 
explored  the relationship  between dividend  payments  and 
company  income  (including extraordinary  income).  The 
results  of these regressions  indicate that firms with  an 
additional  dollar  of income in 1991 distributed 
approximately  40 cents more in dividends.  This is 
comparable  to the estimate  of 56 cents obtained  from an 37 
analysis  of annual data  for the United  States  from 1946 to 
1992.' 
Table  4 
Dependent  Variable:  Investment/Sales 
Sample:  1,837  Firms 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Change Erom 
All values in 1991  1990 to 1991' 
Cash Flow/Sales 
Depreciation/Sales 
Ordinary  Income/Sales 
Extraordinary  Income/Sales 
Cash Flow/Sales t-1) 
Net Stock/Sales 
Net Debt/Sales 
Net  InVeSt/SaleS 
Constant  .052+* 
i.003) 




































1.99  1.98  Durbin-Watson  2.04 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
l  A change in dependent  and all independent variables  from 1990 to 1991 divided by 1991 
sales. 
Additional  tests were conducted  to investigate  the 
relationship  between  income and other sources  of cash  flow. 
It is expected  that higher  levels of income will substitute 
for these other sources.  This is, in fact, what the results 
in Table  5 suggest.  In the first two columns,  the 
coef,ficient  on income is -.211 and -.165.  This means  that 
' Dividends  (D) were  regressed  on company  income after  taxes 
(I) for the same sample of 1,837 firms in 1991.  The result, 
with  standard  errors  in parentheses,  was, 
D = 5.49 +  .395 I  Adj R" =  .61  DW = 2.00 
(1.65)  (.007) 38 
firms  with  a dollar  more  of  income  were  likely  to  have  16 
to  21  cents  less  in  cash  from  the  sale  of  stock.  Recall 
that  the  stock  variable  is  equal  to  the  amount  of  cash 
raised  from  the  sale  of  a company's  own  stock,  less  cash 
used  to  buy  back  its  own  stock.  It  is  possible  that  firms 
with  higher  income  either  sold  less  new  stock  or  bought  more 
outstanding  stock.  In  either  case,  the  result  means  less 
available  for  investments.  The  second  two  columns  estimate 
the  same  effect  for  net  debt.  It  appears  that  firms  with  a 
dollar  more  income  receive  8 to  17  cents  less  from  the  sale 
of  debt.  In  conclusion,  it  appears  that  only  a  small 
fraction  of  additional  income  is  spent  on  investment.  There 
is  some  evidence  that  the  difference  is  either  allocated  to 
dividends  or  used  in  lieu  of  additional  equity  or  debt. 
Table  5 












Deoendent  Variable 
Net  Stock/Sales  Net  Debt/Sales 
1  2  3  4 
.034  .051  .07a+  .120** 
t.061)  t.060)  t.0401  C.035) 
-.211**  -.165*+  -.173**  -.076'* 
t.257)  t.027)  t.0171  C.016) 
.420+  -.223* 




-.3a9*+  -.823+' 
t.0741  (.040) 
.044**  .041+*  -.0003  -.006 
(.007)  t.0071  t.004  C.004) 
.039  .058  .066  .248 
Durbin Watson  2.01  2.00  1.95  1.95 
Note: Standard  errors  in parentheses 
l * Significantly  different  from  zero  at the 1% level. (2.70) 
l * Significantly  different  from  zero  at the 5% level (2.031 
'  coefficient  and standard  error  multiplied  by 100. References 
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